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In the study of Thai politics, the bureaucratic
polity model formulated by Fred W. Riggs more
than two decades ago remains the dominant
conceptual framework [Neher and Bidhya
1984: 1]. Riggs [1966: 396] defined a bureau-
cratic polity "in terms of the domination of the
official class as a ruling class." It was the
weakness or absence of extrabureaucratic
forces capable of controlling the bureaucracy
effectively that gave rise to the phenomenon of
the bureaucratic polity [Riggs 1966: 131; Girl-
ing 1981: 10]. It is widely recognized, how-
ever, that significant changes have occurred in
Thailand since the Sarit regime (1958-63) that
now challenge the model. The present king has
gradually emerged as a significant political in-
stitution. Rapid economic development has
given rise to another important extrabureau-
cratic force, i. e., political parties supported by
businessmen who once were characterized as
politically powerless "aliens" and "pariah"
entrepreneurs by Riggs [1966 : 251-252].
Businessmen's increasing political role is evi-
dent from the number of MPs and cabinet
ministers with business backgrounds [Pisan and
Guyot 1986: 30-36].
Were businessmen really so politically power-
less before the recent development of repre-
sentative democracy? Without electoral poli-
* .:E. ill7i 9::!., The Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University
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tics, were they as powerless as farmers? It
does not seem plausible. Bureaucratic polity
theorists, especially Thai scholars, seem to
make too much of the institutional or formal
aspects of Thai politics, perhaps because they
overestimate the idea of amnat, which usually
means power. However amnat also means au-
thority which derives from any official position
or is sanctioned by law. More important is that
the Thai usually use this word without clearly
discriminating between power and legal author-
ity. They often think of power as something
derived from official authority. The word of
"power" invokes among the Thai the image of
those who hold an official position and are given
a certain authority by law. Thus, for the Thai, a
man of power is man of amnat. Government
officials (civil bureaucrats and military officers)
head the ranking, followed by politicians
(cabinet ministers, members of parliament, pro-
vincial assemblymen, and municipal councilors),
with kamnan (commune chiefs) and village
headmen in the third place.
On the other hand, the power which a man in
authority exerts beyond his authority or which a
man without an official position exerts is called
itthiphon rather than amnat. For example, the
top military brass often intervene in politics,
even under a civilian government. Insofar as
their intervention is not based on law, they use
itthiphon rather than amnat. A businessman
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who gives financial support to a political party or
military leader in order to influence the
decision-making of the government is not a
phu-mi-amnat (a man of amnat) but a phu-mi-
itthiphon (a man of itthiphon) because he has no
official position. Power has a strong connotation
of amnat or legal authority. While it is not easy
to discriminate strictly between amnat and
itthiphon, they are not identical. In a sense,
amnat is formal power and itthiphon is informal
power.
This distinction has implications for the study
of Thai politics. It must be quite easy for the
Thai to accept the bureaucratic polity theory
just because, according to Thai idea of amnat,
bureaucrats have power a priori. The simple
dichotomy of the model that government of-
ficials are politically powerful and the.nonofficial
are powerless coincides with the Thai concep-
tion of power. A man with an official position
has amnat but a man with no position can have
only itthiphon.
Riggs [1966: 339-346] rightly emphasizes
that influence (itthiphon) is very important
within the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he does
not mention that the nonofficial can have
itthiphon and exert it over the official. Such
itthiphon often emerges in the form of a person-
al relationship. The clientelist framework often
used in the study of Thai politics has the critical
weakness that it assumes that bureaucrats are
necessarily the patrons. 1) If we pay more atten-
1) The larger Chinese businessmen maintained a
symbiotic relationship with the 1bai elite from
the 1930s to the 1970s. Generally, this rela-
tionship is thought to have resulted from the
businesmen's powerlessness and defensive mo-
tives. But they were not at the bureaucrats'
mercy. Thai officials could serve on the boards
of Chinese firms "only so long as they remained
tion to itthiphon, it will become clear that
bureaucrats are not always patrons.
There are various types of itthiphon and
phu-mi-itthiphon. Phu-mi-itthiphon try to exert
itthiphon on phu-mi-amnat (government of-
ficials) in order to pursue their own interests.
This may be called polites of itthiphon, which is
quite different from capital city politics (i. e.
coups or parliamentary politics), which is run by
people striving for amnat. Among phu-mi-
itthiphon, businessmen are most prominent. 2)
Businessmen have the most important source
of itthiphon, i.e., economic power, and can
exert itthiphon over almost any bureaucrat at
any level. They usually do so covertly, which
makes it difficult to perceive. However, the
itthiphon of the owner of illegal business over
provincial or district officials, who are field
officiers of the national bureaucracy and come
into contact with local people daily, is compara-
tively easy to detect.
politically powerful and thus useful to their
Chinese friends" [Cough1in 1976: 138]. More-
over, businessmen were not so weak that they
could not manage their business without this
relationship. Not all businessmen resorted to it.
There were few Chinese firms which went into
bankruptcy when their 1bai partners suddenly
lost power in 1973. On the contrary, business-
men were willing to enter into a close rela-
tionship with Thai officials just because they
could derive various privileges from it. For ex-
ample, Sungsigh [1980: 154] quotes a famous
economist's words: "[These] companies would
not pay more than what was due to them, so that
they could receive a net benefit from the protec-
tion. " Such a relationship does not point to
businessmen's powerlessness.
2) The ministry of interior has considered local
phu-mi-itthiphon dangerous to social fairness and
order. It has advocated that they be suppressed
and once classified them into 13 types, most of
which were businessmen [Thai Rat August 6,
1985].
6 -
Y. TAMADA: ItthipJum and Amnat: An Informal Aspect of 1bai Politics
A study of businessmen's itthiphon over pro-
vincial and district officials (including the police)
will serve to give a clear understanding of the
importance of itthiphon, as distinct from amnat,
in Thai politics. I believe it will become clear
that businessmen are far from politically power-
less, and that their power does not necessarily
derive from their significant role in electoral
politics.
Economic Itthiphon
There is a wide gap in income between
businessmen and bureaucrats. A comment
made by a businessman in a small town points
to the gap. "I want my children to receive a
higher education to win respect. I want them to
be merchants rather than bureaucrats because
there is a wide gap in income between mer-
chants and bureaucrats. One day's income for a
merchant may be comparable to one month's
salary for a bureaucrat" [Wanphen 1983: 69-
70].
Bureaucrats can, however, supplement their
low salary with money and services provided by
businessmen. When a businessman wants a
bureaucrat to discharge his official duties
swiftly, he needs to offer a bribe as lubricating
oil (yot namman).3) Bribery of this type is so
widespread that a newspaper calls the
bureaucracy a commercim company collecting
3) Riggs [1966: 249-254] explained the flow of
wealth from businessmen to bureaucrats in the
1950s and 1960s in terms of extraction or
squeezing (nt-that). But the flow is not only the
result of squeezing, and can be classified into
several types. Simply, these are lubricating oil,
open bribery (sinbon) and donation (borijak) from
the standpoint of businessmen. From the stand-
point of officials, they are squeezing and soliciting
(riarm).
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lubricating oil on the authority of approvm and
license [Sayam Rat july 22, 1985]. It is not
easy, however, for bureaucrats to compel an
ordinary businessman to pay more than lubricat-
ing oil. Although the owner of an illegal busi-
ness needs protection and is liable to extortion,
he is usually willing to pay more without com-
pulsion. Capitalizing on bureaucrats' avarice, he
tries to make them collaborators in his illegal
business by providing them an economic in-
terest. That many officials readily accept bribes
is apparent from many cases where bureaucrats
have connived to help or helped businessmen
pursuing illegal interests. For example, officials
of the Deaprtment of Customs have assisted
smugglers [Thai Rat May 24, 1985]; officials of
the Departments of Land, Local Administration
and Forestry have assisted in the illegal acquisi-
tion of title deeds [Dao Sayam june 9, 1985; Su
Anakhot july 27, August 11, 1985]; officials of
the Department of Forestry have cooperated
with sawmill owners in the illegal lumbering of
forests [Thai Rat February 10, 1985; Ban
Muang February 14, 1985; Daily News Octo-
ber 12, 1985]; officials of the Ministry of De-
fense have helped those eager to escape con-
scription [Matichon April 3, 1985; Naeo Na
May 3, 1985; Neher 1969: 319]; and officials
of the Department of Religious Affairs have
helped a businessman dig and steal the earth in
the compound of an uninhabited temple
[Matichon june 15, 1984]. Some businessmen
with illegal businesses go farther, offering regu-
lar rather than one-off bribes, and paying pro-
tection money to the police in order to escape
raids on their businesses. Typical cases involve
the owners of casinos or brothels and managers
of illegal lotteries [Thai Rat April 14, Septem-
ber 8, 1985; Matichon Sutsapda April 22,
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1984].
Cases where bureaucrats are bribed by
businessmen and cooperate with them in an
illegal business are too numerous to list. A
bribed bureaucrat can enrich himself and divide
some of his bribes among subordinates to en-
hance his authority. Although he is a benefici-
ary, he must comply with bribers' various de-
mands and, in fact, gives in to bribers' economic
itthiphon.
This phenomenon would, of course, dis-
appear if bureaucrats did not take bribes. But
even unselfish bureaucrats tend to give in to
economic itthiphon when they receive a dona-
tion from businessmen. It is also difficult for
bureaucrats to manage without receiving dona-
tions. For example, provincial bureaucrats
must hold a lavish reception or farewell party
when a colleague is transferred or a senior
official of the central government visits their
province. In many cases, government funds
and their own spare money are insufficient to
pay for the party and they must therefore ask
local people for their cooperation [Sayam Rat
Sapdawijan October 6, 1985; Matichon Sutsap-
da May 27, 1990]. Another good example is
public construction projects. When bureaucrats
plan a construction of a road, a bridge, or a
school and ask the central government for fund-
ing, the central government does not always
allocate enough funds. A bureaucrat who is
eager for rapid advancement must then raise
funds for the project locally. If he succeeds in
soliciting contributions and carrying out the proj-
ect with no or little expense to the government,
he rises in the estimation of the central govern-
ment [Haas 1979: 73; Krom Kanpokkhrong
1979: 80-86].
In soliciting these contributions, a bureaucrat
cannot expect much of fanners, who usually are
poor and can contribute only voluntary labor.
So he asks help of wealthy businessmen re-
siding in a city or town and who are easy to
contact. In response to his request, business-
men contribute money, land or construction
materials, accommodate automobiles or con-
struction machinery, and, in the case of hotel or
restaurant owners, provide servies at special
prices or free of charge [Preecha 1980: 93-
94; Wanphen 1983: 68].
Businessmen make generous contributions
largely because they expect reciprocation from
the bureaucrat concerned.4) The bureaucrat
feels bunkhun (a debt of gratitude) and namjai
(thoughtfulness, in this case, of the business-
man toward himself) when he receives an indis-
pensable contribution. If he materializes his
gratitude for their favors, businessmen will con-
tribute more; but if he does not, they will show
a negative attitude. Therefore he must repay
their favors if he wants to solicit contributions
on future occasions. A generous contributor
will receive prompter service when he visits a
district office to apply for or register something.
In addition, bureaucrats often bend the regula-
tions and overlook dubious activities by con-
tributors. According to Haas [1979: 79],
businessmen "are glad to purchase it [the good
will of the district officer] for a few thousand
baht in aid to the district's work rather than risk
4) There are various reasons why businessmen
contribute resources to the government. These
are 1) religious merit-making; 2) social fame,
especially the prestigious decorations the king
grants to generous donators; 3) benefits ex-
pected to result directly from the planned
project; 4) reciprocation from the officials con-
cerned. However, these contributions will de-
crease if officials do not reciprocate.
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having to pay several times the amount in taxes
if they are investigated." When bureaucrats
purchase or construct something at government
expense, they may select contributors as con-
tractors.
More important is that giving to bureaucrats
helps businessmen build a close relationship
(sensai) with them, especially such high officials
as district officers and provincial governors.
Such relationships are significant because the
subordinates of the official concerned must
avoid letting their superior lose face and there-
fore may not disclose illegal activities of those
close to their superior. This means that illegal
businesses or other activities by those who
have established close ties with high officials are
overlooked as long as the high officials them-
selves do not take a strong objection toward
them. For example, an acting police inspector
could not arrest a constructor using illegallum-
ber because a provincial governor asked him for
special treatment [Thai Rat October 21, 1984].
There are frequent cases where a suspect
about to be arrested manages to avoid arrest by
claiming close ties with district or provincial
high officials, military officers or politicians. A
photograph taken with a high official or the
official's calling card with signature is evidence
of a close relationship and often functions as a
useful talisman.
Although contribution is less binding on
bureaucrats than bribery, it is an expedient
means for businessmen to buy a close rela-
tionship with high officials. Firstly, they can
offer contributions openly because contributions
lack apparent illegality. Secondly, the recipient
of contributions is a high official who is re-
sponsible for various projects and functions.
Lastly, a high official receiving repeated con-
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tributions assumes a debt of gratitude and will
hesitate to expose or suppress irregularities on
the part of contributors, even though he may
not actively cooperate in them. Contribution is
a safe and easy way to build a close relationship
with a high official. Once a businessman suc-
ceeds in this, he can invite high officials to
private family functions, such as funerals, wed-
dings or birthday parties, and to an inauguration
ceremony of his business. Also he may be
invited to various functions and parties held by
the high officials. These are good opportunities
to show his close relationship with high officials
and to discourage their bureaucratic subordi-
nates from meddling in his illegal activities. If a
subordinate meddles without his superior's per-
mission, his superior loses face and may retali-
ate against him angrily [Matichon Sutsapda June
10, 1984; Matichon September 27, 1984].
Moreover, a businessman can use this close
relationship as a channel for bribery. If he
succeeds, the lured official will become an ac-
tive cooperator with the businessman in pur-
suing illegal interests.
Former prime minister Prem Tinsulanon said
in 1978 when he was the deputy minister of
interior: "Corruption for the most part results
from groups of itthiphon and bureaucrats yield-
ing to them" [Krom Kanpokkhrong 1979: 15].
In this speech he admonished bureaucrats of
the ministry of interior against receiving eco-
nomic benefits from those pursuing illegal in-
terests and yielding to their itthiphon. The
government has given warnings like this re-
peatedly. Moreover, the government provides
that bureaucrats cannot remain at the same
post for more than four years, partly to prevent
them from yielding to itthiphon. But a wealthy
Chinese businessman boasts: "There is nothing
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impossible in Thailand as long as dogs [=
bureaucrats] continue to eat [excrement, i.e.,
small sums of money]" [Sawaeng 1971: 225].
McVey [1984: 119] is right in observing that
"the visible symbiotic relationship between dis-
trict officials and Chinese merchants (the for-
mer providing protection and permission, the
latter cash) showed that at the urban elite level
people were divided between those who could
be bought and those who did the buying."
Businessmen who exert economic itthiphon
over bureaucrats and use them as collaborators
in pursuing interests will not disappear as long
as bureaucrats need bribes and contributions.
To be sure, not every businessman pursues his
interests in this way; and not every bureaucrat
yields to economic itthiphon. But businessmen
who can use bureaucrats as accomplices in il-
legal activities are widespread in most parts of
the country. This shows at least that business-
men are not the powerless subjects of bureau-
crats' amnat.
Political ltthiphon
Businessmen can reinforce economic itthi-
phon with political itthiphon. Here, the political
itthiphon of businessmen means that business-
men can utilize the itthiphon of politicians, espe-
cially MPs, over bureaucrats.
Bureaucrats fear politicians as the disbursers
of reward or punishment. They can expose a
bureaucrat's irregularities in parliament [Daily
News August 27, 30, September 7, 21, 1985;
Ban Muang September 20, 1985] or a provin-
cial assembly Matichon May 9, 1985; Daily
News September 7, 1985]. As we have noted,
many bureaucrats are involved in corruption.
And in order to avoid exposure, they try to
cultivate good relationships with politicians.
Secondly, a member of parliament can some-
times have a say in the promotion or demotion
of a bureaucrat [Lak Thai October 8-14, 1990;
Matichon Sutsapda October 7, 1990]. As for
senior officials of the central government, it is
said that "officials who are not close with politi-
cians cannot get posts, and those who are not
obedient to politicians cannot get power.
. An official who is not close to or has no
sensai with politicians cannot become director-
general" [Matichon October 7, 1984]. In-
tervention by MPs in personnel administration
is not limited to the appointment of senior
officials of the central government. Thai
bureaucracy is highly centralized and senior of-
ficials of the central government have the au-
thority to appoint officials at provincial and dis-
trict level. So an MP can put pressure on these
senior officials to promote or demote local of-
ficials [Matichon Sutsapda March 25, 1984]. A
policeman said: "I ordered my men to inspect a
tax evasion. Later I knew that a powerful
politician was involved in this case. . . My
three subordinates were dismissed from office
. at a high official's request" [Sayam Rat
Sapdawijan July 7, 1985]. MPs cannot always
promote or demote bureaucrats as they please,
because the bureaucracy does not welcome out-
side intervention. But it seems that the poten-
tial ability to reward or punish bureaucrats is
awesome enough to make them obedient.
Thirdly, politicians frequently meet with high
officials and can build close relationships with
them comparatively easily. Therefore bureau-
crats are afraid of politicians and dare not pre-
vent their illegal activities. For example, when
an exceptionally honest provincial chief of police
ordered his men to arrest an MP who gambled
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illegally at his house, some of his men dis-
obeyed the order for fear of revenge, preferring
to be transferred to another province rather
than make the arrest [Matichon December 12,
1984]. This case shows well how bureaucrats
are afraid of politicians.
A businessman can use politicians' itthiphon
in two ways other than by lobbying politicians.
He may himself run for election and be elected,
or he may play a critical role in an election
campaign. Many businessmen are elected to
parliament [Anek 1988: Table 1], a provincial
assembly or a municipal council [Hsing-hsien
Jih-pao August 5, 6, 9, 31, September 9, 1985]
because of their economic power. 5) In Thai
elections, people called hua-khanaen (elec-
tioneers commanding a number of votes) play
an important role because of the rarity of block
votes of interest groups or political parties.
Those who by some means can control the
electoral decisions of many people become hua-
khanaen. Kamnan, village headmen, teachers,
landlords, nak-leng (tough guys who are kind to
their friends and cruel to their enemies) can
become hua-khanaen. Candidates must com-
pete for able hua-khanaen because the result of
an election depends on them so heavily, in fact,
that some of them are murdered during election
campaigns. Besides persuasion and/or intimida-
tion, candidates' money to buy hua-khanaen and
5) Most of these elected businessmen are ethnic
Chinese. Since the revision of the inunigration
act in 1950, which reduced the annual quota for
Chinese inunigration drastically, "many Chinese
businessmen and industrialists have become Thai
citizens through the process of nationalization,
while many more, as time passed, have departed
or retired due to old age" [Pisan and Guyot
1986: 22]. Thus most businessmen enjoy suf-
frage, although some whose father is a foreigner
are still subject to a few minor restrictions.
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to facilitate their gathering of votes is critical in
the struggle for hua-khanaen.
However, most businessmen do not stand for
election. Many provide candidates with election
campaign funds in order to build close rela-
tionships with them. Some are also able to be
hua-khanaen who command a large vote. A
typical case is that of a trader of agricultural
products in a town [Preecha 1980: 216-219].
He tries to buy crops in large quantity by
getting as many as possible of the farmers who
feel obligated to him, mainly because of eco-
nomic dependence, to sell crops to him. He
may well own several hundred rai (l rai=0.16
ha) of agricultural land with many tenant farm-
ers. At the same time, poorer farmers must
rely on him for money, seeds, fertilizer, rice,
medicines and transport facilities. Thus, he can
easily mobilize tenant or indebted farmers in
elections. Moreover, he uses people in a village
as his agents and facilitates their buying of
agricultural products by providing them with
capital, information and other services. These
agents can also be mobilized with their depen-
dent farmers. As about 70% of labor force is
engaged in agriculture, the ability to mobilize
farmers is very important. Siri [1985: 20]
points out that: "Candidates in elections either
to parliament or a provincial assembly will have
a stronger possibility of being elected if they
can get local middlemen [agricultural traders] as
their hua-khanaen."
If a businessman successfully plays a critical
role in an election campaign, he can form a good
relationship with the politician concerned and
use his political itthiphon. Above all, a sponsor
or hua-khanaen of MPs can exercise a great
itthiphon over bureaucrats. For example, an
owner of a large-scale rice mill, who is an
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immigrant Chinese without political rights, sum-
moned an honest policeman to his house and
demanded that he apologize for having fined a
truck driver of his mill for violating the traffic
law. The policeman refused the demand be-
cause he had done nothing wrong. The owner
got angry and threatened to have the policeman
transferred to another province. His threat
came true shortly after, when a deputy minister
of interior who owed much to the mill-owner for
his election ordered the transfer. This case
shows vividly how a businessman can use polit-
ical itthiphon. It is natural that bureaucrats are
afraid of businessmen who have close rela-
tionships with politicians. For this very reason,
some businessmen try to use politicians'
itthiphon to the full. They run their clients, who
are often obscure persons, in a general election
and get them elected to parliament under their
own auspices. These MPs are at their beck and
call. Businessmen nicknamed Sia Leng, Kam-
nan Po, the late Sia Yae and Sia Jiu are most
well-known among them.
To be sure, some businessmen refrain from
intervening in politics because open political
activities may make them enemies and affect
their business. Some have no interest in politi-
cal itthiphon. However, a lot of businessmen
supplement their economic itthiphon with polit-
ical itthiphon.
Politics of Itthiphon and Electoral
Politics
General Chawalit Yongjaiyut [1985: 7], a for-
mer army chief, referred to businessmen's
itthiphon in 1981: "[Some] capitalists are hua-
khanaen of MPs or cabinet ministers. They
patronize government officials with whom they
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have direct or indirect relationships. To sum
up,. . [they] are nothing but owners of
sovereignty pursuing interests with selfish
politicians and bureaucrats as their representa-
tives." Businessmen have such strong itthiphon
over bureaucrats at the local level as to give a
leading military officer cause for concern.
There are some businessmen whom even a
provincial governor, who is thought to have the
biggest amnat in his province, cannot match. 6)
Undoubtedly, the itthiphon of businessmen
has been augmented remarkably by the eco-
nomic development since the Sarit regime,
which has widened the income gap between
them and bureaucrats. Wealthy businessmen
have proliferated almost everywhere, even in
6) A columnist of the most popular newspaper in
Thailand quoted a remark made by a provincial
governor of Uttaradit province. "A provincial
governor is no more than a spokesman for his
province. He cannot match local phu-mi-itthiphon
in barami (grandeur) and power. They fell trees
in the forest without authorization. They kill
anyone who obstructs them. Nevertheless, they
are socially prominent. Government.officials visit
them when the need arises. Officials ask them
for financial supports, borrow automobiles, ask
them to be sponsors of a welcome party for
senior officials from Bangkok, and lastly ask
them to procure girls for attendants to the senior
officials. Their cooperation becomes namjai and
bunkhun which officials should repay but cannot
do completely. Many high officials in the prov-
ince becomes decorations and servants of phu-
mi-itthiphon. For example, these officials are
obliged to attend opening ceremonies of their
shops or funerals of their parents as main guests.
They become big bugs in the province. More-
over, in Thai society wealthy people can buy
greatness by donating money to charity. They
become famous and respected by donating only
10 or 5 thousand baht to someone. In addition,
they become close with people with high position
and increase their barami by donation [Thai Rat
July 18, 1985].
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small townS. Akin [1983: 47] notes: "Recent
changes within the last one or two decades
have affected the relationship in a number of
ways. First, status of merchants which once
was low has made a substantial gain. Wealth
even without bureaucratic status has come to
be accepted as the source of power. With
wealth as the sole resources, the capitalist mag-
nates can even become the patron of the
bureaucratic elites who are underpaid. It is the
exchange between wealth and power of making
public decisions."
However businessmen's itthiphon does not
seem to have arisen only within past one or two
decades. It has always derived from their
wealth. Coughlin [1976: 136] conducted field
research in Thailand in the 1950s and reported:
"It is commonly said that the Chinese can buy
their way around almost any restrictions. "
Bureaucratic corruption and the close rela-
tionship between bureaucrats and businessmen,
both of which were indivisibly related to latter's
economic itthiphon, were even observed in the
nineteenth century [Kanjani 1976] and are not
new phenomena. 7) Rather, they have become
increasingly conspicuous as a result of recent
7) For example, Luang Norakitborihan [1977: 19-
25] who later became director-general of the
department of local administration referred to a
businessman of itthiphon in his memoirs. In
1927 when he was a district officer of Bangphli
district, Samutprakan province, a police inspec-
tor of the district was shot. The suspect was a
wealthy Chinese who owned a market and a rice
mill in the town. He was a kamnan and the
leader of an ang-yi (Chinese secret society).
Because the suspect had a strong itthiphon over
officials of the district, Luang Norakit could not
arrest him at once. Luang Norakit had to com-
municate with senior officials of the central gov-
ernment secretly, bypassing the provincial gov-
ernor, to transfer a few district officials before he
economic growth.
Businessmen's political itthiphon, on the
other hand, has been augmented greatly be-
cause political parties supported by business-
men have, since the mid-1970s, gained suf-
ficient power to compete with the military.
MPs under military or military-dominated gov-
ernments had far less itthiphon than now. But
this does not mean that MPs, provincial
assemblymen and municipal councilors had no
itthiphon at all. It was still better for bureau-
crats not to come into conflict with them. More
importantly, at this time, businessmen could
use the itthiphon of military officers stationed in
various districts. Businessmen could mobilize
material interests to build personal relationships
with these officers and deploy their strong
itthiphon over civil officials [Matichon 1984 :
26-32]. Therefore, it should not be thought
that businessmen have acquired both economic
and political itthiphon over bureaucrats only in
recent years. They have continuously strength-
ened their itthiphon through untiring efforts for
many decades.
In the study of the political role of business-
men in Thailand, most scholars tend to focus
could arrest the suspect with the help of 24
policemen sent from Bangkok. In order to
escape conviction, the suspect bribed witnesses
and tried to offer the district officer a bribe of as
much as 20 thousand baht. Failing in this, he
undertook a campaign for the transfer of the
district officer. When the minister of interior
visited the district, he firstly tried to offer the
minister a gift in order to secure an audience
with him to ask for Luang Norakit's transfer.
Secondly he mobilized many people in the town
to petition the minister for his transfer by
slandering him. Although this attempt failed too,
this incident shows clearly that a wealthy
businessman could exert itthiphon over bureau-
crats at that time.
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only on their direct participation in electoral
politics or trade associational activities. Bureau-
cratic polity theorists overestimate bureaucrats'
amnat and argue that this should be limited by
parliament, political parties or interest
groups. They make too much of the fonnal or
institutional aspect of Thai politics and pay less
attention to its infonnal aspect. Even those
who use the clientelist framework tend to com-
mit the error of regarding bureaucrats a priori
as patrons of businessmen. Businessmen with
close ties to bureaucrats are seen as the power-
less who beg favors of the bureaucrats. For
example, Jacobs [1971: 48] writes: "At best, a
private individual who believes he has a political
grivance or interest to pursue can only hope to
establish some personal, individual (i. e. , pat-
rimonia!) patron-client relationship with an of-
ficial to insure that authority will not operate to
his disadvantage, especially at a time when he is
least prepared to deal with it." Yet how can
those businessmen who exert itthiphon and
manipulate the bureaucrats at will be power-
less? If they cooperate with bureaucrats be-
cause of political powerlessness, the increasing
power of political parties supported by
businessmen must decrease their cooperation.
On the contrary, the development of parliamen-
tary democracy has added fuel to the fire. The
emergence of political parties as a significant
political force has encouraged businessmen to
exert itthiphon over bureaucrats more fre-
quently and strongly. This means that
businessmen's use of itthiphon does not result
from their political powerlessness at all.
Rather, their itthiphon is a sign of their political
powerfulness. They are the privileged class and
are often patrons of bureaucrats.
It may be argued that businessmen exert
itthiphon mainly at the stage of policy imple-
mentation rather than policy making, that they
influence policy making only to a limited extent,
and that direct participation in parliamentary
politics is more effective. However, itthiphon at
the implementation stage is no less important
for businessmen who wish to protect and fur-
ther their interests politically, for at least four
reasons.
The first reason is that government officials
at the local level do not necessarily implement
policies or orders of the central government
faithfully and often mutilate them. Riggs [1966:
361] notes: "It was only the formal authority
structure that was highly centralized in the Thai
bureaucratic polity. To a considerable degree,
each of the subordinate agencies of the govern-
ment was relatively autonomous in actual oper-
ations. The effective control of the center over
its subordinate operating units was not very
large. In other words, the real pattern of power.
distribution was highly equivocal." The imple-
mentation of government policies is relatively
uncertain because of such autonomy on the part
of bureaucrats, their deliquency, their self-
interest, or, in some cases, the infeasibility of
the policies. "So basic a governmental function
as law and order is personal and not universal:
it is extra clout that is made available to those
who have access to (for example) the chief of
police. The idea of 'rule of law' is not natural to
Thai society; laws are seen merely as descrip-
tive decrees, and to activate them one must
have a specific arrangement, effectively a con-
tract between an individual and an officer or
official" [McVey 1984: 116]. Even Sarit, who
is famous for exercising the most authoritarian
and certralized rule in modem Thailand, could
not control the bureaucracy completely. For
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example, he ordered the metropolitan police
commander and all provincial governors to sup-
press hooligans (anthaphan). Thousands of
hooligans were arrested and many of them
were sent to a reformation center in Bangkok.
However some of them were not hooligans.
Moreover, several provinces defied the order
and did not send hooligans to the center [Sapha
Wijai 1964: 96]. We can conjecture that, under
other prime ministers, there must have been
ever more room to bend state policies at the
implementation stage.
The second reason is that the politics of
itthiphon waged between puh-mi-amnat (mainly
bureaucrats) and phu-mi-itthiphon (mainly
businessmen, but also others) is fairly stable.
The famous vicious circle of Thai politics-a
coup, a dissolution of parliament, a new con-
stitution, a general election, and another coup
-has shaken parliamentary politics seriously.
But it has neither engendered an extensive
reshuffle of the civil bureaucracy nor greatly
affected local officials or the politics of itthiphon.
Moreover, the transfer of all officials of a prov-
ince or district to another place at one time,
which would surely undermine the politics of
itthiphon, is inconceivable in any circumstances.
The third reason is that the politics of
itthiphon is accessible to many people. It de-
velops at every level of the bureaucracy.
In some cases businessmen must bargain
with permanent undersecretaries or director-
generals of the central government. But policy
implementors at the provincial or district level
tend to cooperate with businessmen because of
their self-interest and because they are more
vulnerable to itthiphon than their counterparts
in the central government. Therefore, many
people can readily participate in the politics of
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itthiphon, according to the size of their
itthiphon. In addition to wealth, information,
sensai with a high official, an ability to mobilize a
number of people, or even violence can be an
effective source of itthiphon.
The fourth reason is that bureaucrats re-
spond immediately and certainly to successful
wielders of itthiphon. The size of benefits that
can be achieved through the politics of itthiphon
is usually smaller than that through parliamen-
tary politics. However, policies and laws formu-
lated in parliament must await implementation
and may not be implemented to the letter.
Thus, as a way of pursuing interests, the poli-
tics of itthiphon can be said to exceed par-
liamentary politics in stability, accessiblity, im-
mediacy and sureness.
Businessmen can translate their wealth into
political power through the politics of itthiphon,
and as such constitute a significant part of Thai
political elite. That they are among the political
elite is evident when we compare them with
farmers, who have little resources for itthiphon
over bureaucrats. The politics of itthiphon
makes bureaucrats very partial and widens the
gap between the rich and the poor. The politics
of itthiphon does not obviate the need for elec-
toral politics for phu-mi-itthiphon: they can
pursue more interests through parliamentary
democracy. But it should be noted that they
can exert itthiphon even without parliament and
even under a seemingly bureaucratic-author-
itarian regime. They can dispense with par-
liamentary democracy. The politics of itthiphon
is a significant reason why a Thai political sys-
tem characterized by weak legislature has sur-
vived. Under such a system the military and
civil bureaucracy may monopolize political
amnat. However, they are not, as many
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· bureaucratic polity theorists argue, strong
enough to monopolize political power because
they must share it with phu-mi-itthiphon.
Furthermore, it is difficult to be optimistic
about the democratization of Thai politics, be-
cause it is these participants in the politics of
itthiphon who are the main supporters of in-
creasingly powerful political parties. It is un-
pleasant for those enjoying various privileges
through the politics of itthiphon to endorse the
further development of representative democ-
racy or the realization of politics which can
reflect the interests of the powerless masses
who are unable to participate in politics of
itthiphon.
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